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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 17038

CARAL LEE OWENS and RUDELL
OWENS,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
An Information filed against defendants Caral Lee Owens
and Rudell Owens was quashed when Judge Allen B. Sorensen
determined that the charging statute, Section 76-6-410(b), Utah
Code Ann.,

(1953), as amended, was unconstitutionally vague.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On March 28, 1980, the State of Utah filed an Information

against the defendants for violating Section 76-6-410(b), Utah
Code Ann.,

(1953), as amended, and they were arraigned in the

Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County.

Defendants entered

pleas of not guilty at the time and counsel for the defense was
arant~n
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davs in which to file motions.

On the 1st day of

April, 1980, counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Quash.
A hearing was held before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen,
Fourth Judicial District Court, in·and for Utah County, State
of Utah, on April 4, 1980.

The matter was argued, the Court

took the matter under advisement and on that same date granted
respondents'~

Motion to Quash.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The State of Utah respectfully moves this Court to
reverse the

deci~ion

of the Fourth Judicial District Court and

find that Section 76-6-410(b), Utah Code Annotated is not
unconstitutionally vague.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is from a final order issued on April 4,
1980, by Judge Allen B. Sorensen in the Fourth Judicial District
Court, Utah County, granting

respondents'~

-Motion to Quash.

That

Court erroneously concluded that the language "gross deviation
from the agreement" in the charging statute was unconstitutionally
vague.
The Information originally filed in this action charged
respondents Caral Lee Owens and Rudell Owens with violating
Section 76-6-410(b), Utah Code Annotated - theft by person having
custody of property pursuant to repair to rental agreement.

The

State was prepared to present evidence showing that on May 18,
1979, the respondents signed an agreement with James Butterfield
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of Provo to rent from him a 16-foot trailer for a period of
one month.

On June 22, 1979, respondents rented another

trailer again for a one-month period, but at the end of the
month, rather than return the trailer, respondents phoned Mr.
Butterfield and asked if they could keep the trailers for another
month.

He consented, but told them to send him some money

to cover the rental period.

They agreed to send him the money.

The money never arrived and Mr.
respondents again.

Butterfield did not hear from

In December of 1979, the respondents were

picked up in another state and the trailers recovered.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
ACTS OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE ARE
ENTITLED TO A STRONG PRESUMPTION
OF VALIDITY.
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Nielsen, 19 Utah
2066, 426 P.2d 13 (1967), set forth the following as preliminary
consideration:
The general rule of statutory
construction is to hold an enactment of
the legislature valid unless it clearly
appears to violate some provision of
the Constitution of this State or of
the United States.
See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, 99.
Further, in State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 651 (1952):
It is necessary that statutes should
not be declared unconstitutional if there
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is any reasonable basis upon which
they may be sustained as falling within
the constitutional framework . . . and
that a statute will not be held void
for uncertainty if any sort of sensible,
practical effect may be given it.
And finally, in State v. Geurts, 350 P.2d 12 (1961):
~ . . our conclusion is reinforced by
the well known precept that any doubts
must be resolved in favor of constitutionality.

The doctrine of "void for vagueness" has evolved as
the product of wisdom in search of ways to preserve human dignity.
There is, in this case, no claim that a constitutional right
of the defendant has been violated; no freedom of speech or
religion violations; no freedom of association violations or other
violations specifically guaranteed rights.

Certainly the statute

which serves as the legal basis f0r the information against
defendant is not subject to ambiguous interpretation.
POINT II:
"GROSS DEVIATION" FROM THE AGREEMENT IS A
PHRASE COMMONLY USED IN MODERN PENAL STATUTES
WHICH PROSECUTE THE UNAUTHORIZED EXERCISE OF
CONTROL OVER RENTAL PROPERTY AND SUCH STATUTES
HAVE BEEN UPHELD IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS.
Oregon, New Hampshire, Maine and New York all have
theft statutes that closely resemble Section 76-6-410, Utah
Code Annotated.

A common element of each state's statute is

that a "rentor" can be held criminally liable for using rented
property even where the property was once held pursuant to a
valid agreement if:

1)

the "rentor" intentionally withholds

possession of the property;
owner; and

3)

2)

without the consent of the

thab unauthorized retention of possession con-

stitutes
a "gross deviation" from the rental agreement.
High
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courts in each of the states have recently considered cases
involving violations of their unauthorized use of rental
property statute and none have held the "gross deviation"
language to be unconstitutionally vague.
Both the Maine and the New Hampshire Supreme Courts
have recently decided cases that involved theft of rented
property.

Although the constitutionality of the language in

the statute was not an issue, neither Court had difficulty
applying the statute.

State v. Craney, 381 A 2d 630

State v. Murgatroy, 349 A 2d 600

(Me 1978),

(NH 1975).

The New York Supreme Court has had several opportunities to directly consider the "gross deviation" language and has
never found the term too vague to apply to specific fact
settings.

People v. Lafler, 393 NY 2d 484

410 NY S 2d 619

(1978).

(1977), People v. Rici,

In each of these cases, the Court

specifically dealt with violations of the statute that would
require an application of the "gross deviation" standard.

In

neither instance did the Court confront any difficulties applying
the statute so as to justify labeling the phrase unconstitutionally
vague.
The only state Court that has specifically confronted
the issue whether "gross deviation from the agreement" is unconstitutionally vague is the Court of Appeals of Oregon.
State v. Boyd, 560 P2d 689 (On. App. 1977), the lower

In

Court
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in Multnomah County held that O.R.S. 164-135(1) (c) was
unconstitutionally vague.

The State appealed and the Court of

Appeals of Oregon reversed, finding that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague.

That statute provided:

(1)
A person commits the crime of
unauthorized use of a vehicle when:
(a)
He takes, operates, exercises
control over, rides in or otherwise uses
another's vehicle, boat or aircraft without
the consent of the owner; or
(b)
Having custody of a vehicle, boat·
or aircraft pursuant to an agreement between
himself or another and the owner thereof
whereby he or another is to perform for
compensation a specific service for· the
owner involving the maintenance, repair
or use of such vehicle, boat or aircraft,
he intentionally uses or operates it,
without the consent of the owner, for his
own purpose in a manner constituting a
gross deviation from the agreed pu!pose;
or
(c)
Having custody of a vehicle,
boat or aircraft pursuant to an agreement
with the owner thereof whereby such
vehicle, boat or aircraft is to be returned to the owner at a specified time
he knowingly retains or withholds possession
thereof without consent of the owner for so
lengthy a period beyond the specified time
as to render such retention or possession a
gross deviation from the agreement.
Despite appellent's arguments to the District Court,
that the "gross deviation" language is unconstitutionally vague,
there is no support for that conclusion in the decisions of the
other states with similar statutes.

On the contrary, the
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language at issue has provided a fair and workable standard
by which to determine the criminal nature of specific conduct.

POINT III:
THIS COURT HAS ENDORSED THE "GROSS
DEVIATION" LANGUAGE BY APPLYING IT
IN THE CONTEXT OF UTAH'S NEGLIGENCE
STATUTE.
Section 76-2-103, Utah

Code Annotated provides:

(3) Recklessly or maliciously, with
respect to circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct when
he is aware of but consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and deg~ee that its disregard constitutes
a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would exercise
under all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is
criminally negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the
result of his conduct when he ought to be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist or the
result will occur. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that the failure
to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that
an ordinary person would exercise in all
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
(emphasis added).
The language "gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would exercise" and that in
Section 76-6-410(b) are remarkably similar.

Both contemplate

an expected standard of activity and a departure from that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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expectation sufficient to constitute a gross deviation.

Several

times, in;recent years, this Court has decided cases involving
the "gross deviation" language of Section 76-2-103.

In each

instance, this Court has demonstrated that a trier of fact
could and did determine whether conduct of the defendant so
varied from the accepted standard of performance as to
constitute a "gross deviation."

In none of these cases did

this Court find that applying the term resulted in a denial of
constitutional rights.
State v. McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah, 1978), was an
appeal from a judgment of the Fifth District Juvenile Court,
Grand County, finding defendant guilty of aggravated assault.
This Court affirmed the conviction.

Reaching that decision,

the Court specifically discussed the language of Section
76-2-103(3), holding that the evdience supported defendant's
convictione

In State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226 (Utah, 1979),

this Court reversed the defendant's conviction of automobile
homicide and remanded with directions to instruct the jury
on criminal negligence as the term is defined in Section
76-2-103(4) rather than mere simple negligence.

In reaching

that conclusion, this Court reasoned that the "gross deviation"
language required a higher degree of culpability than simple
negligence implied:
Section 76-2-103(4) . . . requires proof
that defendant's conduct placed another at
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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risk; that the risk be substantial
and unjustifiable; and that failure to
perceive the risk constitutes a
gross (emphasis added by the Court)
deviation from the reasonable man's
standards. A higher level of culpability
required under Section 76-2-103(4) than
that defined in Instruction 18 (simple
negligence).
This Court's frequent application of the "gross
deviation" language in defining negligence directly rebuts
appellant's argument that the term is unconstitutionally vague.
The term is a useful and practical standard by which the
trier of fact can determine whether given conduct so far
departs from a required course of action as to require imposition
of criminal liability.
POINT IV:
"GROSS DEVIATION" IS A JUSTICIABLE
PHRASE, CALCULATED TO GIVE A PERSON
OF ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE A REASONABLE
OPPORTUNITY TO KNOW WHAT IS PROHIBITED
Defendants' brief asserts that the charging language
of the information is so vague in defining the prohibited acts
that it denies the defendants due process of law in violation
of the test delineated by the Supreme Court in Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972),

In that case,

-9-
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the United States Supreme Court conclude-a that a constitutionally
proper statute must:
(1) "give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibied, so that he may act
accordingly."
(2) prevent "arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement" by providing
explicit standards for those who apply the
law, and (3) not inhibit the exercise of a
person' a First Amendment . freedoms.
The facts alleged by the state, if proven, would appear
to clearly constitute, as a matter of law, acts that a person of
ordinary intelligence would know to be criminal and prohibited.
The criminal acts in the area of rental property and rental
agreements constitute such a wide range of possible fact
situations that the only sensible method of defining the criminal
activity is to use a general phrase of common understanding
such as "gross deviation."

Anything short of such an approach

would present the risk of imposing criminal sanctions for a
mere technical violation of a specific legal tenet in connection
with a set of circumstances that are not criminal in nature when
viewed in their totality.

The "gross deviation" language merely

assists the trier of fact in determining whether or not a criminal
intent was formulated and a criminal act committed.
In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct.
808, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
. . • On the other hand, if the general
class of offenses to which the statute
is directed is plainly within its terms,
the statute will not be struct down as
vague even though marginal cases could be
put where doubts might arise . . . and if
this general class of offenses can be
made constitutionally definite by a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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reasonable construction of the statute,
this Court is under a duty to give the
statute that construction.
Section 76-6-410(b), is a recodification of the former
section 76-17-5, which read:
Every person who has leased or
rented a motor vehicle, trailer,
appliance, equipment, tool, or other
valuable thing, and who willfully fails
to return the same to its owner within
ten days after the lease or rental
agreement has expired is guilty of
embezzlement.
The major difference between the above statute and
Section 76-6-410(b) is that the latter imposes criminal liability
only upon a finding that the intentional failure to return the
property as promised constitutes a "gross deviation" from the
agreement.

The earlier statute provided that mere willful failure

to return the property within ten days after the agreement has
expired was a crime.

Obviously, the legislature intended to

allow the trier of fact the opportunity to look at more than just
~he

time of delay before reaching a decision as to the criminal

nature of the breach.

The comments regarding similar provisions

in the Codes of other states are helpful in determining the
rationale behind such a change.
Recently the New York State Legislature provided a
minimum standard of "gross deviation" from the agreement.

That

standard was intended to include, but not be limited to, situations
where:
. . . a person who having had custody
of a vehicle for a period of fifteen days or
less pursuant to a written agreement retains
possession of such vehicle for at least seven
days beyond the period specified in the
agreement
and
continues
such
Sponsored
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Library.
Funding for digitization
provided possession
by the Institute of Museumfor
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a period of more than two days after
service or refusal of attempted service
of a notice in person or by certified
mail at an address indicated in the
agreement stating (i) the date and time
at which the vehicle was to have been
returned under the agreement; (ii) that
the owner does not consent to the continued
withholding or retaining of such vehicle
and demands its return.
. . . (N.Y~P.L.
Section 165.05}.
Although the New York Legislature retained the "gross
deviation" language, the fact that it had provided a minimum
standard concerned some commentators.

Aware that the Courts of

that state had successfully been applying the statute in the
past, Arnold D. Hechtman expressed misgivings about the wisdom
of providing a static measure when the ·statute as worded
allowed the courts to consider all the circumstances surrounding
a breach of an agreement before concluding that that breach rose
to the level of a crime:
Being cast in terms of a flat
definition of gross deviation rather
than as a presumption of gross deviation,
the statute has now been burdened with a
degree of inflexibility that may make it
difficult for the trier of the facts to
assess each case of overtime retention on
its own peculiar facts.
It is to be noted
that only the short-term (i.e., over 15
days) rentals or from other forms of
agreements involving bailments with respect
to an automobile, is subject to this
definition.
(Arnold D·. Hechtman, Supplementary
Practice Commentary to N.Y.P.L. Section 165.05).
The comments following Title 17-A Section 361 of the

Maine Criminal Code indicate that the "gross deviation" language,
attacked by defendants as unconstitutional, was intended to
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

provide increased fairness and due process for a person
accused of theft of rented

p~operty.

The comments state:

Subsection 1, paragraph B is designed
to reach the garage mechanic who uses a
vehicle left for repair as his own personal
means of transportation. The use must,
however, be more than minor, and must constitute a "gross deviation" from the basic
reason for the vehicle having been left to
him.
It is necessary to have some limit of
this sort on the criminal liability created
by this section, and the "gross deviation"
limit serves to create a jury question on
the issue so that all of the circumstances
can be taken into account.
(Comment, Me.
C.C. 17-A, Section 360).
Although defendant argues that the language of Section
76-6-410(b) denies him due process of law, the apparent intent
of the legislature and the effect of the statute is to do exactly
the opposite.

Under the former 76-17-5, a person could be found

guilty of committing a crime for a mere ten-day delay in
returning the rented property.

The present statute allows the

trier of fact to consider all of the circumstances surrounding
the failure of the defendant to return the rental property.

If

the failure to return does not constitute a "gross deviation",
then the defendant is not criminally liable.

Section 76-6-410(b)

thereby provides a more fair and rational basis upon which to
determine criminal liability in given circumstances than did
its predecessor.
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CONCLUSION
A "gross deviation from an agreement" is simply a
criminal breach of that agreement.

Defendants' arguments that

they have been denied constitutional rights is without merit.
The phrase is not unconstitutionally vague; contrarily, the
phrase provides a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited.

Such language has

been upheld by the Courts of other states in criminal statutes
regarding rental property and has been used and upheld in Utah
in connection with statutes involving criminal negligence.
For these reasons, the State respectfully requests
that this Court find that Section 76-6-41-0{b), Utah Code
Annotated, is not unconstitutionally vague and reverse the
decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
NOALL T. WOOTTON
County Attorney

J

--fl~~/

\

vv.,J fd..., ~
-·- STEVEN B.
ILLPACK
Deputy Utah County Attorney
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